The usual story of the "first era of globalization" at the end of the nineteenth century sees Denmark as something as an outlier: a country which, like Britain, resisted the globalization backlash in the wake of the inflow of cheap grain from the New World, but where agriculture, rather than going into decline, in fact flourished. Key to the success of Danish agriculture was an early diversification towards dairy production. We dispute this simple story which sees Denmark as something of a liberal paragon. Denmark's success owed much to a prudent use of trade policy which favoured dairy production. Moreover, this favouritism continued even after a more general movement to free trade in the 1860s. Using micro-level data from individual dairies, we quantify the implied subsidy to dairy production from the tariffs, and demonstrate that this in many cases ensured the profitability of individual dairies.
Introduction
Denmark stands as a curious outlier in the history of late nineteenth century globalization. After a brief flirtation with free trade inspired by the British repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s, many European countries returned to agricultural protection from the 1870s as a response to the inflow of cheap grain from the United States and other new producers. The United Kingdom chose to remain a free-trader, and saw the dramatic decline of her agricultural sector. In this story, Denmark also chose to remain open, but with rather different results.
By the end of the nineteenth century, there was no doubting the success of Danish agriculture, and the British market was crucial for that success. In 1875-79, 49 per cent of Denmark's total agricultural export value went to the UK. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this had increased to 73 per cent, and as much as 90 per cent for specific products such as butter and pork. Seen from the British side, the proportion of butter supplied from Britain was around 15 per cent at the end of the 1870s, but over 40 per cent by the beginning of the twentieth century. For bacon, the proportion rose from under 1 per cent to close to 50 per cent. As Henriksen (1992) suggests, these growing market shares were a "demonstration of the competitiveness of Danish farm products".
Danish farmers succeeded by diversifying into high-quality meat and dairy produce and, from being a net exporter of grains, Denmark now became a net importer, and used this cheap supply to feed the animals her agriculture was to become so heavily dependent on. Thus, by "maintaining free trade, the Danes adhered to a national tradition of liberalism, a reflection of a small economy without any domestic mineral resources" (Henriksen 1992, p. 156) . By the end of the nineteenth century, Denmark's success in these industries stood as testament to the folly of the return to protectionism in other countries (Persson 2010) . We aim to nuance this simplistic interpretation of Danish success. Trade policy did, in fact, play a vital role in the early history of the Danish dairy industry. Moreover, the establishment of a dairy industry was vital for the later success of Danish bacon.
To demonstrate this, we go back before the breakthrough of Danish agriculture in the 1870s, and reemphasize an important but often neglected point: that Denmark was diversifying towards dairy production from an early date, and this meant that she was in a privileged position when opportunities for dairy expansion presented themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century. The importance of the early beginnings of the shift of Danish agriculture has been recognized by Danish economic historians. For example, Henriksen (1992, p. 159) writes:
"One implication of the early reorganization of production is that the time-and capitalconsuming process of building up herds of milk cows was well underway before the introduction of modern dairy technology impelled animal husbandry towards further productivity gains. It Furthermore, we document that this tariff support continued even after 1864, with the maintenance of a tariff on cheese. Using micro-level data from individual dairies, we quantify the value of the implicit subsidies to dairies implied by the tariffs from 1850-1898 and demonstrate that it exceeded the level of profits in many cases. Far from being a liberal paragon, Danish success owes much to the protection afforded by her tariff laws. Moreover, contemporaries were aware of this, as we also document.
The traditional story
The traditional story tells how Denmark went through a long "crisis of grain sales" of ca. 1876-94 which incited a diversification of agriculture into dairy and meat production (Hansen 1984, p. 184) . The reasons given for why Danish agriculture succeeded in adapting to the challenges of the second half of nineteenth century are commonly given as follows (adapted from Bjørn 1988, pp. 348-9):
1. Land reforms meant that holdings were large enough to be able to benefit from new technologies.
2. Peasant emancipation meant that decisions and financing could adjust more easily.
3. Farmers enjoyed a high education level.
4. There were no grain tariffs, thus allowing the use of cheap grain for feeding the animals involved in dairy production.
5. There was public support for research and research institutions.
We dispute none of these.
The timing of this change is often dated from around 1870, which saw the beginning of large scale exports of butter to the UK, followed by a boom in pork (especially bacon) exports in the 1880s: see figure 1.
Figure 1: Danish exports of butter and pork, 1830-1900
Source: Christensen (1985, pp. 88-89) Transportation improvements in the 1860s facilitated this export breakthrough (Hansen 1984, p. 187 ) and institutional and technological changes from the late 1870s, i.e. the founding of cooperative dairies and the invention of the mechanical centrifuge for separating cream from milk, ensured the continued success of Danish agriculture.
In reality, however, the shift towards animal products started as early as the 1850s, as others have noted (see for example Olesen 1977 and Nielsen 1977) . This is illustrated in figure 2. 1830  1833  1836  1839  1842  1845  1848  1851  1854  1857  1860  1863  1866  1869  1872  1875  1878  1881  1884  1887  1890  1893  1896 1899
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The reason for this early shift in production is often attributed to "heroes" of Danish agriculture, such as the large landowner, Edward Tesdorpf. His estates were run as experimental stations, and in various articles from the 1840s he publicized the idea of holding dairy cows, instead of sheep, for fertilizer. He also realized that cows could also be used for other things than simply fertilizer machines, i.e. to produce milk and dairy products. He was also largely responsible for popularizing the idea that improved feed for the cows could increase the production of milk (la Cour 1890). His pioneering work was followed in the 1850s by many articles published on how to run dairies (Bjørn 1988, p. 157) .
Institutional changes were also crucial for the success of Danish dairies. Before the 1860s, large landed estates established a reputation for producing good quality butter. Their success was emulated from 1863 through the establishment of faellesmejerier (private dairies), which bought up milk from the local producers of the area (Bjørn 1977) . These later lost ground to cooperative dairies from the 1880s, which were an even more efficient institution and took advantage of new technology for producing butter: particularly the centrifuge (Hansen 1984, p.
189).
We do not want to revisit this story of Danish success from the 1870s and 1880s (see Henriksen 1992). We do, however, ask the question as to why the shift towards dairies began so early in Denmark, so that there was such a strong base for the later take-off. Attempts to understand this early shift have been rather limited. Early accounts stressed the hypothesis of soil "overexploitation" during the period of grain export, but this was convincingly shot down by Jensen (1988, pp. 284-86) . More recently, historians have looked at price developments. The prices of animal products did indeed rise rather more than those of grains, as illustrated in figure 3 . We use English prices because they reflect the development of Denmark's most important export outlet. 3 Not including the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. This change in relative prices might be explained by the larger income elasticity of animal products, combined with rising incomes in Denmark and abroad (Henriksen 1992, p. 159) .
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Cheese seems to have received tariff treatment like a luxury good (along with products such as tobacco and sugar with accordingly high ad valorem rates). 6 What was, however, a substantial duty on high-quality imported cheeses was a prohibitive barrier to the import of low-quality cheese. The price series used to calculate the AVEs in figure 4 are those for Danish cheese. The decrease after 1821 is due to increasing prices rather than decreasing tariff rates -in fact, the nominal tariff rate on cheese was even increased by 25% in 1863.
7
How important was cheese, however? Cheese was not of importance as an export commodity in Denmark -see figure 5 -which has meant that it has been somewhat overlooked in the literature. The specific nature of the tariff of 1863, and prior to this date, meant that cheap cheeses faced effectively prohibitive trade barriers, and caused Danish producers to specialize in low-quality cheeses -an argument akin to that long recognized for industrial protection (see above). Only in the summer, when there was plenty of milk and butter prices were thus at a low, did some dairies produce cheese with a higher fat content. Even this was mostly sold to the neighbourhood (Burchardt 2005 , p. 5).
5 Thomsen (1991, p. 37) seems to have been the only scholar to recognize this point before. 6 The official price estimates used to value Danish foreign trade tellingly illustrate the difference between imported and domestic cheese: While imports were priced at 0.25 rigsdaler (0.50 dkk) per pund in 1857, exports were valued at 0.10 rigsdaler (0.2 dkk). In 1875, imports were valued at 0.67 dkk per pund, and exports at 0.24 dkk per pund. Hence, Danish authorities estimated the value of the cheese imported at the high tariff rates to be 2.5 to 2.8 times the value of domestic export quality cheese. 7 The rate before was 4 rigsdaler 16 shillings per 50 kg, after it was 5 shillings per pund. A shilling was 1/96 of a rigsdaler, which was converted to the Danish kroner in 1873 at 1:2. Sources: Christensen (1985, pp. 88-89 & 94-95) .
Note:
The picture is distorted by the inclusion of the Schleswig-Holstein dairy industry prior to 1864, after which the Duchies were lost to Bismarck. These areas, according to Tesdorpf (1875, p. 505) , always had a surplus of cheese. Moreover, the spike in cheese export in 1880 is probably a mistake in data, since almost all is recorded as being exported in the one extraordinarily atypical month of January 1880 (4:15, p. 40).
The reasons why Danish cheese exports were so unsuccessful is not difficult to explain. By all accounts it was disgusting. It was produced from the skimmed milk left after as much cream as possible was removed in order to make butter, and this skim-milk cheese was tellingly known as "laederost" (leather cheese) (Axelsen Drejer 1925-33, p. 214) . Of these, the poorest quality, produced by peasants, as late as the mid-1870s, were described as "never made for sale…
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Before 1860 there had been some debate as to whether the dairy industry should concentrate on butter or cheese for export (Bjørn 1982, p. 28 ) and this debate continued in later years (see for example Tesdorpf 1875). However, it was only after 1900 that there was much increase in the interest for cheese production (Axelsen Dejer 1925-33, p. 405 ).
Nevertheless, a substantial amount of cheese was produced. Segelcke (1879), as professor of Dairy-Husbandry at the Royal Agricultural College in Copenhagen, was probably the best informed commentator on the state of the industry. He states that the "two principal products of Dairy-Husbandry are… butter and skim-milk cheese", the production of which was "very considerable". It might not have been palatable, but it was an almost necessary by-product of butter production, and by virtue of the prohibitive tariff on cheese, Danes were forced to consume it (and many probably knew little else). This implied a substantial subsidy to dairy production, even after the tariff reform of 1864. 
The implied subsidy from tariff protection for individual dairies
We are lucky that several producers understood the importance of keeping accurate and detailed accounts from an early date (see Axelsen Drejer 1925-33, p. 290), and we make use of these from various archival and published sources. Since we have farm gate prices for the majority of the dairies included 11 , we can calculate individual-dairy implicit subsidies scaled to their individual revenues from the three products. We do this by valuing the production of each dairy product (per cow) and using ad valorem equivalents of the tariffs to suggest the proportion of this value attributable to the tariffs. A weighted average (by number of cows) of the available observations each year is presented in figure 6 . The appendix gives every observation.
9 "…i Modsaetning til Grosserer Busck ikke paa nogen Maade kan gaa ind paa en Toldnedsaettelse og endnu mindre paa en fuldstaendig Ophaevelse af Ostetolden" (Tesdorpf 1876, p. 579 The calculated value of protection per cow can be compared with the typical profit that could be expected, as revealed in a detailed account of the accounts provided by Jenkins (1876, pp. 26-37) of an individual dairy (Kjaersgaard, nr. Horsens, Jutland). The accounts revealed gross income of £21 7s. per cow, and a profit of £1 5s. 6½d., i.e. just 6% of gross income. The value of the subsidy from the tariffs clearly made individual dairies profitable.
Caution must be taken in interpreting figure 6 as a time series, however, and it is really the full account given in the appendix which is the important record. The number of observations changes almost everywhere, and the sample is also changing with the accounts available to us.
See also the notes in the appendix on the construction of the series. This is a problem for us, because cooperatives were the main users of a new technology which made cheese production more difficult: the invention in 1878 of the steam-powered centrifuge or automatic cream separator. The adoption of the centrifuge seems to have occurred remarkably quickly. In the report for 1878-9 it is described how only a few centrifuges are used (4:14, p. 54), but already the year after they "play a large role" (4:15, p. 44).
This machine could remove nearly all the butterfat from cream instead of just two-thirds, which was the average of more traditional methods (Bjørn 1988, p. 247) . Whilst this led to increases in production and the price (quality) of butter and is considered one of the reasons for the rise of cooperative dairies (Bjørn 1988, p. 324) , it meant that cheese became difficult, and therefore more expensive, to make as a by-product of butter production (see also the experiments described by Fjord, 1882, and Storch, 1886) . Despite initial fears, it was soon proven by experimentation, however, that this skimmed milk could be used perfectly effectively for feeding pigs (Fjord 1884) . Although reports in the early stage focus on the problem of poor handling of cheese (4:10, pp. 318-9 323) and explain how it was not cost effective to feed pigs rather than produce cheese (4:12, p. 91), this soon changes (4:14, pp. 37 & 45) . By 1881 cheese is described as being worth much less than pork (5:1, p. 70) . Jenkins (1882, p. 30) describes how dairy factories with cream separators were "somewhat careless about the manufacture of skimcheese, which was only made occasionally, and then, as it seemed to me, rather badly" and that it was necessary to add "butter-milk… to the skim-milk for cheese-making, as the separator so entirely denuded it of cream". He concluded that "a sufficient time has not yet elapsed to enable dairymen to find out exactly how best to treat skim-milk which is so entirely deprived of its cream as that which has passed through a well-managed separator". The Mejeriberetning for 1882 describes the problems of using skimmed milk from a centrifuge (5:2, p. 56) and the following year how this makes the concentration on butter even more pronounced (5:3, p. 53).
There were experiments with adding cheaper fats, but these didn't seem to work (5:4, p. 65) .
Instead, the skimmed milk was used more and more for feeing pigs, calves and there were even experiments with feeding children (5:4, p. 69). The report from 1887 notes the fact that many cooperatives produced no cheese 12 (5:7, p. 89) . By 1892, reports suggest that the waste products from butter production were now "more frequently used for feeding swine and young stock" (BPP 1893, p. 9) . Moreover, by 1897 it seems that Danish cheese could no longer compete despite its protection due to competition from cheap Russian cheese (5:17, p. 78).
Another problem with the data is that, for some years, production of cheese exceeded demand, and this might mean that we overestimate the revenue from cheese production, although this is again from a late date. It seems that excess cheese production often came when pork prices were low. This is the case in 1875-6, for example (4:10, pp. 317 & 322) and in 1878 when cheese became "unsellable" (4:13, p. 54). In 1885 there were large quantities of cheese left unsold and the author scolds producers by saying that it "doesn't make sense to keep producing a product just because of old habits" (5:5, p. 64) . The same was the case in 1886 (5:6, p. 52) and in 1888 (5:8, p. 81) . High prices in 1890 again caused many cooperatives to begin making large quantities of cheese (5:10, p. 97), and even greater price increases in 1891 exacerbated this trend, and it is described how cheese became difficult to get hold of, even centrifuge cheese, and that it was difficult to find workers to produce it (5:11, p. 132) . This boom inevitably led to bust in 1892: prices fell, but since there were no large inventories, there was no overproduction "like six years previously" (5:12, p. 134) . Inventories are however again described as "full" in 1893 (5:13, p. 122-3) , and similar overproduction problems are seen in 1896, again caused by low pork prices causing an increase in cheese production (5:16, p. 108).
12 Although it also criticizes this for being wasteful.
The problems with overproduction of cheese are attributed in the report of 1885 to the increased income of Danish workers, who had become "too prosperous to consider the simple cheese as a main source of nutrition" and that "trying to change people's taste" was hopeless (5:5, p. 66) 13 .
However, in many cases for the individual dairy accounts recorded in the appendix, we have the actual revenue from sales of cheese and moreover, excess cheese could be fed to the pigs (5:6, p. 72). Furthermore, since we are principally concerned with the period prior to 1880, this does not impact much on our conclusions: it is clear from figure 6 that the dairy industry enjoyed considerable support until 1864, during which the transformation of Danish agriculture had already begun, and even enjoyed some support after this, despite the long-standing idea that
Denmark's success came as a free-trading country.
The emerging private modern dairy system then generally gave low priority to the production of skim-milk cheese 14 , but instead sent the skim-milk back to the producers, of which a large part was used to feed pigs. It seems that cheese production, and thus the importance of the tariffs, died with the invention of the separator. However, it is clear that in this way the great advances of the Danish dairy industry in introducing new technologies and institutions, which owed so much to the previous expansion under the tariffs, was also the source of the later great increase in pork production. We turn to this point in the following section.
Cheese making in the cooperatives
In order to document the relative unimportance of cheese making for the cooperatives, and the incentive to move to pork production, we rely on two pieces of evidence: first from the records of the creameries and, secondly, from published statistics. We have extracted information from the books of minutes of the general meeting and the board meetings of 215 cooperative 13 "…vil man endelig lave Ost, saa søg da at fremstille et Produkt, der kan afsaettes"… "Den danske
Kjøbstadarbejder er for godt stillet til at betragte den simple Ost som sit Hovednaeringsmiddel."… "at forsøge at forandre Folks Smag er i Ostespørgsmaalet i Øjeblikket haabløst".
creameries, roughly one in five of the 1100 cooperative creameries that existed around 1900.
Although the level of detail in these hand-written records varies considerably from creamery to creamery, they generally give us detailed information about the running of the creamery. Most of the cooperatives in our sample, 138 of 215, were established during the latter half of the 1880s, a period of strong growth. Where possible, we follow the records from these creameries up to World War I. In addition to the archival material on each creamery, we also make use of The references are typically found a) In the statutes or bylaws of the creamery; b) In the contract the creamery made with the manager employed. In some cases his employment, among other things, was conditioned on his ability to make cheese, should the creamery wish it. In other cases cheese (like cream and milk etc.) was part of his payment in kind. Finally, his salary might partly depend on his performance in cheese making, either on the quantity made or the sales revenue; c) In the decisions to build a room or a store for cheese. 15 We cannot guarantee that this sample is representative. There is some overlap between our sample of minute books and MDS. 98 of the creameries in our sample are represented among the 523 creameries who returned accounts to MDS for the period November 1903 -November 1904. Comparing the mean and variance for the 98 included with the remaining 424 creameries, we find that: means of year of formation, raw milk processed, and butter produced do not differ significantly. The variances are only significantly different for the year of formation, where the variance is greater among the creameries not in the sample.
The following excerpts from the minutes of "Bakholm", Northern Jutland, we find is illustrative of the development of cheese production in many cases § 9 in the statutes of 1898: "Skimmed milk or buttermilk is returned to the farmers, corresponding to half of the raw milk they supply. The remaining part is made into cheese that is either sold or distributed to the coop members." 1903, decided at an extraordinary general assembly: "it is up to the individual supplier how large a part of the (skimmed milk) he wants returned and how large a part of it he wants to receive in the form of cheese and whey." 1 March 1909 an extraordinary general assembly decides: "The board of members gets the right to limit the making of cheese to 1/3 of a member's (skimmed) milk if the production gets too large." 4 May 1909 "Cheese production has to be stopped because the cellar is full." (Historisk arkiv, Vendsyssel)
The peripheral role of cheese is underlined along with the failure, in the longer term, to sell this inferior product, even on the local market. In the same vein, the creamery "Ellinge-Eier", Eastern Jutland records how:
In 1887 a general assembly decides that ( Apart from the dairy farmers themselves the only outlet for cheese was normally retail sale directly from the creamery to other local people. 16 In 1888 the average farm gate price of cheese as reported in the dairy accounts was 14.8 øre per pund.
We have taken the liberty to interpret the term "cheese" in the minutes as a synonym for skimmed milk cheese, see, also the first quotation. Only in two of the 93 cases is full milk cheese production mentioned. In eight cases, however, a cheese grocer is involved. That, at least, signals a wider market for the product, although we don't know whether it was for skimmed or full milk cheese. The scant attention to cheese grocers is in stark contrast to that of butter grocers. Hardly a year passes by without a reference to the grocer in question and to the contract for the delivery of the butter.
Finally, the greater success of other nations in making and exporting cheese had not passed totally unnoticed by the cooperatives, thus, according to the minutes from Kjaedeby, Funen:
In 1900 the manager "applies to the board to cover the travel costs either domestically or to Holland to make himself familiar with the making of finer cheeses." It is granted. In 1903 he leaves and buys his own creamery [apparently not a cooperative] (Rudkøbing lokalhistoriske arkiv)
Cheese was, then, clearly not a priority for the cooperatives. It remains, however, to document our hypothesis that the failure of the cooperatives in cheese making was directly made up for by an increase in the production of pigs for marketing at home and abroad. We establish this by comparing the ratio of the number of pigs to the number of milch cows in 1903, a year for which we have information on cheese making from 511 cooperative creameries from the MDS.
Unfortunately there is not always a perfect match between the administrative units, the counties, and the regions used in MDS. Nevertheless, the fact that cheese making is highly geographically uneven justifies at least an attempt.
We would not expect a linear relationship, since a relatively low number of pigs per cow would not necessarily imply large-scale cheese production (the waste products from butter production could be used in other ways -for example the skimmed milk could be sold to towns for human consumption). What we should expect, however, is that areas with a large number of pigs per cow should have very limited cheese production, and this is what we do indeed find, as illustrated in figure 7.
Most counties had approximately one pig per cow, and in these places cheese production was either common or very limited. For the three counties with very large numbers of pigs per cow, however, namely Bornholm, Frederiksborg and Praestø we find almost no cheese productionnearly all the skimmed milk was being used to feed the pigs. 
Tariffs and AVEs
Tariffs on grains and animal products were specific. These specific rates were assessed from the 
Minutes of meetings of cooperative creameries
The minutes of the cooperatives' general assembly meetings and board meetings were found in local archives from all over Denmark, only ten were located in the Danish Business Archive in Aarhus. Information on the existence of the archival material is documented in the database www.danpa.dk (search 'andelsmejeri'). We chose to read the material from all cooperative creameries that were established in the 19 th century and followed them, whenever possible, to 1873 Kjaersgaard 40 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/ Before 1879, data comes from different sources, so it is not always clear whether the accounts refer to the actual milk cows, or to the total of milk cows, breeding cows and older calves held on the farm, which was significantly higher. Where the number of cows had to be guessed from partial or summary figures, the number used for the calculation is given in parentheses. When prices were missing, we use the mean of prices from places where we had data for. These prices are reported in parentheses.
Hence, for earlier years, year-to-year fluctuations in milk, butter, and cheese output per cow can reflect different accounting practices referring to the number of cows as well as to the relative importance of cheese, which was clearly higher for the farms covered between 1864 and 1875 than for the bigger sample afterwards. We were unable to evaluate whether this reflects a change in relative importance in production over time or between places. It is likely a mix of both, since available (archival) data for Søholm Gods, Basnaes Gods and Hesselagergaard (the latter not used due to missing cow numbers) indicates that production of cheese became less important between the middle of the 1870s and the first half of the 1880s. Therefore, our "subsidy series" in Figure 6 seems to reflect a general trend, but might overstate it due to a likely sample selection bias before 1876/79.
The "net income from pigs" refers to the value of sold pigs (as given in the "gross" column) minus other inputs that are neither milk, skim-milk, buttermilk nor whey. For many places at early datesincluding all accounts in Tidsskrift for Landøkonomi before the 1879 series -the actual pig production was not reported. We used reasonable assumptions following Schroll (accounts for Basnaes Gods (for 1880) about the "value of milk-byproducts from the milk used as input for butter-making and cheese" which are fed to pigs and make up their net value. The first
